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Conclusion 
Sheila A.M. McLean and Sarah Elliston 
 
When making policy in areas as sensitive and emotional as human reproduction, 
regulators and legislators are likely influenced by their perception of public opinion and 
what public policy should embrace. In each of the countries considered in this narrative, 
which were selected primarily because of their similar jurisprudential traditions and 
because – unlike the United States – there has been legislative activity specifically 
targeted at this area, legislators have tended to adopt what might be called a 
precautionary approach and indeed, there may be expectations that they ought to do so. It 
has, for example, been said that: 
 
Many of the decisions about what to regulate or to legislate about depend on the 
approach taken with regard to the balance of harm and benefit or potential harm 
and potential benefit. It has become fashionable to specify that authorities 
(whether that be Governments, agencies, industry, watchdogs etc) should take a 
‘precautionary approach’ or adopt the ‘precautionary principle’.1 
 
This principle, which is widely used in debates on the environment, has been 
described as follows: 
 
Simply put, the precautionary principle (PP) calls for the world to take action to 
make products, environmental activities and technology safer, healthier and 
accountable to everyone.2 
 
 
1 HCSTC, Fifth Report of Session 2004–5, Human Reproductive Technologies and the 
Law, vol. 1, HC 7–1, 24 March 2005, p. 22, para. 47. 
2 See www.ehow.com/about_5184467_definition-precautionary-
principle.html#ixzz1nackJtpt (accessed on 27/02/2012). 
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Expressed in this way, the principle seems unexceptionable. It is self-evident that 
we would wish products, technologies and activities to be as safe as they can be. 
However, one negative implication of this principle is that it can be used as a means of 
stifling innovation in the face of anxieties – whether or not realistic – about possible 
harms from potential developments. There have been criticisms in the UK of the 
‘excessive use’ of a precautionary approach in regulating assisted reproductive 
techniques,3 and we would suggest that this observation could be made in respect of 
regulation in many, if not most, of the jurisdictions considered in this volume. This kind 
of approach taps into public and regulatory fears about the advances in science and can in 
itself generate further distrust, or fear of so-called slippery slopes. 
While science has contributed to making human life easier, more bearable and 
longer than previously, there is, in some quarters at least, suspicion about its goals and 
the way in which it is regulated. For example, a report by the (UK) Office of Science and 
Technology (OST) and the Wellcome Trust found that: 
 
There is concern about the effectiveness of the regulation of science, and the 
qualitative research found that participants saw regulation as being very secretive 
and bureaucratic. Having some idea of the end product brings more faith in the 
regulatory system – hence some respondents were more positive about 
engineering and technology than about science. Seven out of ten agree that: 
Rules will not stop researchers doing what they want behind closed doors 
But only a third believe that: 
Science is getting out of control and there is nothing we can do about it 
And two out of five agree: 
The speed of development in science and technology means that it cannot be 
properly controlled by Government.4 
 
3 HCSTC, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, vol. 1, p. 117, para. 263. 
4 Science and the Public: A Review of Science Communication and Public Attitudes to 
Science in Britain, Office of Science and Technology, London: Wellcome Trust, October 
2000, para. 4.26. 
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These findings clearly demonstrate the ambivalence sometimes shown towards 
science and scientists. On the one hand, people believe that it (or they) cannot be fully 
controlled, while on the other holding out some hope that control is indeed feasible. In 
any event, the precautionary principle is by no means uncontroversial. One of the 
problems that a review of UK regulation conducted by the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee (HCSTC) identified is that there are different interpretations 
of the precautionary approach that are used by various groups to seek to achieve specific 
goals. Indeed, the role of such arguments as part of the political process of influencing 
regulatory agendas has been documented in a number of chapters in this book. The 
HCSTC promoted a particular medical/scientific understanding of the precautionary 
principle and contended that in this sphere it had never meant ‘proceed only where there 
is evidence of no harm’; rather that: 
 
In clinical practice it means proceed cautiously and in a manner amenable to 
ethical oversight and clinical audit while there is no evidence of sufficiently 
serious harm or potential harm to outweigh benefit or potential benefit, while 
being vigilant in looking for unintended and otherwise adverse outcomes.5 
 
As a result, it concluded that ‘alleged harms to society or to patients need to be 
demonstrated before forward progress is unduly impeded’.6 Nonetheless, one author at 
least sees some potential (if somewhat cynical) benefits to the use of a precautionary 
approach, saying ‘[i]n one sense…the precautionary principle might have some utility. If 
we apply the precautionary principle to itself – ask what are the possible dangers of using 
this principle – we would be forced to abandon it very quickly.’7 
 
5 HCSTC, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, vol. 1, p. 22, para. 47. 
6 Ibid., ‘Conclusions and recommendations’, p. 175, para. 3. 
7Anon., ‘Beware the precautionary principle’, Social Issues Research Centre, available at 
www.sirc.org/articles/beware.html (accessed on 22/02/2012). 
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When the science in question relates to ‘making babies’, ambivalence can 
coalesce into something more forceful, with more than seven out of ten people 
interviewed for the above study into public attitudes to science agreeing that ‘[p]eople 
shouldn’t tamper with nature’.8 Leaving aside the question of what is so inevitably 
‘good’ about nature – which after all gives us conditions such as cancer, which we are 
generally happy to use scientific knowledge to try to prevent and treat – the poss
intervening in the ‘natural’ process of reproduction is anathema to some individuals and 
groups. Thus, assisted reproduction in and of itself is wrong; nature should be left to run 
its course, and if this means condemning hopeful intending parents to childlessness, so be 
it. This view is often associated with certain faith groups, from whose perspective all life 
is a gift from, and controlled by, a god whose will is supreme and who has a plan for each 
of us that may or may not involve parenting. Even from a more secular perspective, the 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Warnock 
Report) described the response to the birth of the world’s first in vitro fertilisation (IVF) 
baby, Louise Brown, as a mixture of: 
 
pride in the technological achievement, pleasure at the new-found means to 
relieve, at least for some, the unhappiness of infertility, and unease at the 
apparently uncontrolled advance of science, bringing with it new possibilities for 
manipulating the early stages of human development.9 
 
This leads directly from the precautionary principle to an exploration of slippery-
slope arguments. As is evident from the OST/Wellcome Trust Report, there does seem to 
be some unease about the possibility that science will create its own momentum and will 
inevitably take us to places we do not want to, or should not, go. The notion that 
scientists will ‘do what they want behind closed doors’ carries the implication that at least 
some of this work, of which the public generally may be unaware until a technique has 
 
8 Ibid., para. 4.9. 
9 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Warnock 
Report), London: Stationery Office, 1984, at p. 4. 
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been successfully developed, will have unwanted or unacceptable consequences. In the 
area of human reproduction, this fear is perhaps at its most acute. The anxiety that 
science might allow for the birth of animal–human hybrids or the cloning of armies of 
dictators entered the public consciousness through popular literature and the media. 
However unlikely these outcomes may be, the unease that the mere possibility generated 
has probably tainted attitudes to certain areas of research and techniques developed from 
it and, in turn, has created an atmosphere in which the precautionary principle seems – to 
some at least – entirely appropriate. Doctors and scientists are accused of ‘playing God’ 
and legislators and regulators are encouraged to intervene to prevent the seemingly 
inevitable slide down the slippery slope towards Armageddon. Almond, for example, 
says ‘[e]ver since the development of the first atomic weapons…people have been aware 
that scientific advance divorced from ethical sensitivity is a Frankenstein’.10 
Making policy in this area, in the face of these and other, perhaps less extreme, 
concerns can be very difficult. In liberal Western democracies, such as the countries we 
have considered in this volume, the tradition of a relatively ‘hands off’ approach to the 
role of the state vis-à-vis its citizens can seem inappropriate in the area of human 
reproduction, and therefore to be worthy of challenge. The assumption that essentially 
private matters – such as reproduction – are not the concern of the state seems especially 
vulnerable when medicine and science offer not just the opportunity to circumvent 
fertility problems but also to choose what kind of children to have. Fox, for example, 
argues that ‘advances in biotechnology give special reason to rethink our liberal 
commitments. Liberal arguments about liberty, equality, and harm to others will not do 
when it comes to practices that seek to remake nature.’11 The state, therefore, may on this 
argument have a legitimate role in shaping and controlling the decisions that intending 
parents can make. In a limited defence of the so-called ‘nanny state’, Calman says that 
‘the state has a duty to look after the health of everyone, and sometimes that means 
 
10Almond, B., ‘Philosophy, medicine and its technologies’, J Med Ethics 14 (1988): 173–
8, at 173. 
11 Fox, D., ‘Retracing liberalism and remaking nature: designer children, research 
embryos and featherless chickens’, Bioethics 24(4) (2010): 170–8, at 178. 
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guiding or restricting people’s choices’.12 Even the relatively liberal report from the (UK) 
Science and Technology Committee conceded that ‘assisted reproduction and research 
involving the embryo of the human species both remain legitimate interests of the state’, 
albeit with the caveat that ‘[r]eproductive and research freedoms must be balanced 
against the interests of society but alleged harms to society, too, should be based on 
evidence’.13 
For others, however, reproduction is an essentially private matter, even when it 
requires medical assistance, and the state should not intervene to prevent intending 
parents either from gaining access to the necessary technology or from using all of the 
technology at their disposal, particularly pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). This 
argument, as we have seen in some of the earlier chapters, is based on the concept of 
reproductive liberty; the idea that in the absence of evidence of harm, people should be 
free to make their own decisions about whether and when to reproduce and what kind of 
children to have. In fact, as Jochelson notes: 
 
The debate over the limits to state intervention and extent of individual freedom 
weaves through the history of public health. In the simplest terms, it divides 
between interventionists and libertarians. For interventionists, governments 
promote freedom for individuals by creating opportunities and leveling out 
inequalities in society. For libertarians, minimal government is the best way to 
protect individual freedom, which is about not being interfered with by others.14 
 
This is no less true in the arena of assisted reproduction. For policy makers, then, 
the fundamental issue is which ethical position should be adopted. 
 
12 Calman, K., ‘Beyond the “nanny state”: stewardship and public health’, Public Health 
123 (2009): e6–e10, at e9. 
13 HCSTC, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, vol. 1, para. 46, p. 22. 
14 Jochelson, K., ‘Nanny or steward? The role of government in public health’, Public 
Health 120 (2006): 1149–55, at 1150. 
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As we have seen, most of the jurisdictions we have considered have opted for a 
legislative response that assumes that some restrictions are appropriate. In other words, 
the emphasis on reproductive liberty that so dominated human rights rhetoric in the 
aftermath of the negative eugenics prevalent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries has not been fully translated into policy. Not only may people be denied access 
to the technology, and therefore denied the opportunity to parent, but even those accepted 
as suitable to receive the technology may find the choices that could flow from this to be 
limited by state policy. So, how does policy come about?  
While we might wish to believe that public policy is based on proven facts and 
shaped in a rational and deliberative manner, this is by no means a given. Page says: 
 
Insofar as they arise from conscious reflection and deliberation, policies may 
reflect a variety of intentions and ideas: some vague, some specific, some 
conflicting, some unarticulated. They can…even be the unintended or 
undeliberated consequences of professional practices or bureaucratic routines.15 
 
Policy may also be, as Walsh says, ‘peculiarly open to distortion by political and 
social ideology’.16 The presumption that people should not be totally free to obtain access 
to assisted reproductive technologies, or the unfettered use of the options it makes 
available, seems to reflect (at least) a social ideology that prioritises speculation about the 
kind of parents people will be, or the kinds of decisions they will make, over reproductive 
liberty itself. In most of the arguments in favour of limiting choice (apart perhaps from 
those based on faith) dominant anxieties are about the welfare of future children, fitness 
for parenting or the creation of ‘designer babies’.  
 
15 Page, E.C., ‘The origins of policy’, in Moran, M., Rein, M., Goodin, R.E. (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 
(paperback, 2008), pp. 207–27, at p. 207. 
16 Walsh, P., ‘Principles and pragmatism’, Medical Law Review, 3 (autumn 1995): 237–
50, at 237. 
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To be sure, the welfare of children is a legitimate interest of the state; hence, there 
are laws in place that seek to protect children from abuse or neglect. However, it is surely 
problematic for the state to regulate in an effort to balance the possible welfare concerns 
of potential future children with the deeply felt desire of people to reproduce. This is 
especially true where the outcome of the decision concerns whether or not technology 
should be used so that such a potential future child can be conceived. Equally, fitness for 
parenting is a concept intimately linked with the compulsory sterilisation programmes of 
the early to mid-twentieth century, and is – in any case – not a test that those who can 
reproduce naturally have to meet before becoming parents. Of course, it might be 
objected that assisted reproduction is different from natural reproduction because 
although we cannot prevent people in the latter case from reproducing, we can – perhaps 
should – attempt to ensure that people are suited to parenting when third-party 
(sometimes state) involvement is necessary and regulation is feasible. While this 
argument may have an immediate appeal, it should be remembered that unblocking 
fallopian tubes and reversing vasectomies also require third-party involvement, are done 
with the aim of restoring reproductive capacity, but do not require evidence of parental 
fitness. On what grounds, therefore, would those who require more advanced 
technologies be required to jump this further hurdle? The mere fact that we can limit 
choice is not a sufficient justification for doing so. Nevertheless, while reproductive 
decisions might reasonably be regarded as essentially private, whatever the context in 
which they arise, it seems that the temptation for states to interfere in them where they 
arise in connection with IVF and associated techniques has been irresistible, at least in 
the majority of the jurisdictions we consider here. 
As to PGD specifically, objectors often use emotive language about ‘designer 
babies’ and ‘parental acceptance’ to show why its use should either not be permitted or 
be limited. Each of these has been canvassed already in this manuscript, but they bear 
brief reconsideration here. People seeking to use PGD (and they remain relatively rare) 
will often already have experience either of having a child affected by a genetic 
condition, or may have knowledge that such a condition is present within the family. The 
desire to avoid the birth of a child with certain disabilities is probably derived both from 
concern for the quality of the future child’s life and anxiety about their own ability to 
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cope with such a child, perhaps particularly when another affected child already exists in 
the family. The effort to avoid such births, however, has been criticised as not 
demonstrating the love that parents should have for their children, no matter what. Of 
course, it could equally be argued – and we would agree – that parental love is also 
evident in decisions to avoid future suffering for a child as well as in concern for their 
existing children.  
Nonetheless, the argument that parents should be willing to accept whatever child 
they are fortunate enough to have is commonly used by the opponents of PGD. The 
notion of parental virtue is thereby introduced to cast doubt on the intentions or morality 
of those who would seek to prevent the implantation of an embryo known to be affected 
by a particular condition. A virtuous (good) parent would not make choices of the sort 
that PGD makes possible. To say that such an argument is naïve is, perhaps, an 
understatement. There is no rule of thumb that tells us what a ‘good’ or virtuous parent 
would or should decide. Is a virtuous parent one who chooses not to know that the child 
they are attempting to conceive may suffer and die young, or one who uses technology to 
avoid such suffering by choosing to have a different child?  
Further, in support of their claim that the slippery slope really does exist, 
opponents of PGD will point to the next stage in ‘designing’ babies; the creation of a 
child who can provide matching tissue to save the life of an existing, but ill, child. This, 
they might argue, instrumentalises the child and shows it inadequate respect. Again, these 
arguments have been raised elsewhere in this volume, but it should be restated that while 
the precautionary principle might suggest that such choices should not be permitted 
because the child may be harmed, there is no evidence to support such a gloomy, and not 
entirely logical, conclusion.  
Another argument that will be considered briefly here is the not uncommon one 
that PGD is just another form of eugenics, and on that basis alone it should not be offered 
as an option. It also follows on this account that we disvalue people already living with 
disability by selecting against embryos with the same characteristics. In effect, 
proponents of this argument equate non-implantation of specific embryos on the grounds 
of potential disability with the sterilisation programmes of Nazi Germany and some 
disability rights activists see such choices as discriminatory and demeaning for people 
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living with disability. The first point can be cleared up relatively easily. The Nazi 
sterilisation policies (and those which existed in the United States and elsewhere) were 
formulated by government and backed by state coercion – they were not based on the free 
and informed choice of intending parents. The denial of reproductive liberty, and the 
abuse that inevitably flowed from it, was the actual harm. No liberal supporter of PGD 
would wish to see it used as part of a mandated state programme; rather, they would 
emphasise the need for a free and uncoerced choice by intending parents. Of course, 
eugenics – for historically valid reasons – has a bad reputation, but as the HCSTC said, 
‘[i]f ensuring that your child is less likely to face a debilitating disease in the course of 
their life can be termed eugenics, we have no problem with its use’.17 
As for the second issue, it bears repeating that preferring to implant an unaffected 
embryo as opposed to an unaffected one in reality does not disrespect people already 
living with the condition. In choosing, for example, not deliberately to have a child 
suffering from a condition that would prove fatal early in its life, intending parents do not 
lose concern or compassion for those who are born with the condition. If intending 
parents could shape a future for their children that guaranteed the best possible health, or 
the absence of a specific disabling condition, might they not reasonably wish to do so? 
Making such a choice does not imply that they become aggressive, hostile or dismissive 
in respect of people who have the same condition; merely that, where choice is available, 
some might reasonably want to avoid the situation arising. 
It is interesting to note that exactly the opposite concerns have arisen where 
people seek to use PGD in order deliberately to select an embryo for implantation that 
has a genetic make-up associated with a potentially disabling condition. Such possible 
choices have attracted even more widespread condemnation, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that, contrary to the fears expressed above, many people do think it is legitimate and even 
morally virtuous to seek to avoid having children that may be affected by disability. 
However, though it often seems to be ignored, this runs up against the same objections to 
imposing state controls on the kinds of children that people can and should choose to 
have as are raised by the earlier examples. Again, people who wish to select an embryo 
 
17 HCSTC, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, vol. 1, p. 55, para. 116. 
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because it has a genetic condition linked with disability are most likely to do so because 
they have direct experience of the condition. They will be in no doubt that any children 
they might have with the same condition have as much potential for a good life as anyone 
else’s. They may go further and argue that a child without the condition might pose 
greater challenges to them as parents in providing what they consider appropriate care 
and support within the family and its social network. The extent to which a state is 
justified in regarding such views as so irresponsible as to be impermissible is surely open 
to question. On a liberal account, it would be necessary to demonstrate harm before state 
intervention would be legitimate. Given that the selected embryo only has the potential to 
be a child with that particular disability this poses distinct problems, as demonstration of 
harm to a future child would require it to be established that the balance of risks and 
benefits lies in avoiding its existence. 
Finally, using PGD for sex selection on non-medical grounds has widely been 
dealt with by legislative prohibition, although the reasons for this may be regarded as far 
from convincing. For example, the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
stated that one of the major arguments justifying a prohibition on this practice was the 
public response to consultation which, in its view, had indicated ‘considerable alarm 
among consultation respondents that children selected for their sex alone may in some 
way be psychologically damaged by the knowledge that they had been selected in this 
way as embryos’.18 Leaving aside the fact that the numbers who responded to the 
consultation were extremely small, such justifications have not passed by entirely without 
notice. The HCSTC was robust in its disapproval of this stance, commenting that ‘[t]hus 
the most persuasive argument was not that there was evidence of harm but that there was 
evidence of concern about harm. This is not a satisfactory use of evidence to support 
policy advice.’19 It concluded that although sex-selecting embryos raised ethical issues 
concerning the creation and destruction of embryos which warranted some caution, in the 
absence of convincing evidence of psychological harm to children, arising from having 
been selected for sex, or wider demographic impact concerns, ‘[t]he onus should be on 
 
18 Ibid., p. 121, para. 272. 
19 Ibid. 
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those who oppose sex selection for social reasons using PGD to show harm from its 
use…On balance we find no adequate justification for prohibiting the use of sex selection 
for family balancing.’20 Despite this, its recommendation was not followed in the 
subsequent legislation.21 
However, if, as the HCSTC suggests, the onus of demonstrating harm from the 
use of PGD is on those who oppose its use, this hurdle would seem hard to overcome, at 
least at this stage in the clinical application of PGD. It must be recognised that it may be 
much more difficult to demonstrate certain types of alleged harm than others. Detecting 
that an embryo carries genes associated with medical illness or disability may well not 
enable accurate prediction of the extent to which a child will be affected. Even where the 
prognosis is reasonably clear, there is still room for a substantial difference of opinion 
over whether the effects on the child should be regarded as ‘serious’, and in consequence, 
whether an embryo should or should not be used for treatment. Another set of possible 
risks relates to safety concerns: that interventions upon embryos have the potential to 
cause them damage or affect their development, with a consequent reduction in 
successful live births or an increase in birth defects. Some kinds of harm may not be 
detected immediately, but would depend upon long-term studies of children born using 
these techniques, and possibly their own children, and establishing the existence of such 
risks may require many years of data collection. By way of comparison, the drug 
diethylstilboestrol (DES) prescribed for pregnant women at risk of miscarriage from the 
1940s to the 1970s, was found to have a number of adverse effects upon the women 
themselves and their children, such as the risk of developing forms of cancer. However, it 
also affected these women’s daughter’s reproductive systems leading to increased risk of 
pregnancy loss and other complications.22 Research suggests that additional health 
 
20 Ibid., p. 64, para. 143. 
21 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, amending and supplementing the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
22 Hoover, R.N. et al., ‘Adverse health outcomes in women exposed in utero to 
diethylstilbestrol’, New England Journal of Medicine 365 (14) (6 October 2011): 
1304–14. 
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problems may be suffered by the third generation, i.e. grandchildren of the women for 
whom DES was prescribed.23 The existence of many of these adverse effects clearly 
could not be established until years after the drug was originally taken, and research is 
continuing. There is similarly an inevitable difficulty in establishing at the present time 
whether diagnostic procedures undertaken on embryos carry any significant health risks 
to children or subsequent generations. The same concerns arose when IVF was developed 
and we are still less than 40 years from its first successful clinical use. As the HCSTC put 
it ‘[t]he safety of assisted reproduction has been a matter of conjecture, since even the 
earliest children born using IVF are still only young adults’.24 In commenting on the use 
of novel techniques in assisted reproductive techniques (ART), an independent working 
group, set up by the UK’s Medical Research Council at the request of the HFEA, wrote 
that:  
 
Although there is widespread acceptance, based on experience, that current ART 
procedures are generally safe, the evidence for this, particularly in terms of long-
term safety, is relatively weak when compared to other similarly well-established 
clinical techniques. Too little is known about the basic mechanisms of early 
human development – whether natural or assisted – about interactions between 
the mother and her growing baby, or about the overall risks and benefits of ART 
to draw firm conclusions about whether a new treatment may have any unforeseen 
adverse consequences.25 
 
While the understanding of human development may have moved on since this 
report was drafted, many questions remain. However, it would seem that, despite some 
residual concerns and objections, much of assisted reproductive technology – perhaps 
 
23 National Cancer Institute, Factsheet: Diethylstilboestral (DES) and Cancer, 
www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/DES (accessed March 2012).  
24 HCSTC, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, vol. 1, p. 19, para. 36. 
25 Medical Research Council, ‘Assisted reproduction: a safe, sound future’, London, 
2004, p. 2. 
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especially IVF – has become accepted in each of the jurisdictions addressed here, and of 
course in many others. Indeed, for many, IVF is a routine medical procedure, requiring 
only the availability of relevant resources and the agreement of individuals/couples and 
clinics. For this reason, regulation is muted, with its focus being primarily on safety and 
quality rather than an examination of the acceptability of the procedure. The same cannot, 
however, be said of PGD.  
Here also, questions of safety and quality inevitably arise. It is of course 
impossible to state with any certainty that new procedures carry no risk, and even if some 
risks are found to exist, what is at issue is a risk–benefit analysis. While proponents of the 
precautionary principle would point to the lack of evidence as requiring a cautious 
approach, a liberal account would prioritise reproductive liberty unless and until evidence 
of harm is found. How a risk–benefit analysis is calculated will, of course, depend on 
which interests and concerns are prioritised. This, in turn, as we have seen in relation to 
making public policy, will depend on many factors, including the personal morality of 
legislators and regulators and their views as to what is, and is not, acceptable or 
important. 
On this point the MRC may be seen to have adopted a view that is commonly 
taken; one that prioritises concerns about child welfare: 
 
Throughout their deliberations, the subgroup worked on the basis that the 
mother's health and well-being are important, but the health of children, who have 
no choice about how they are conceived, must be the overriding concern in 
demonstrating whether ART treatments are safe and effective.26 
 
However, in reality, it seems that there was a certain level of ambiguity towards 
this prioritisation of child welfare, since the Report concluded that: 
 
Waiting to assemble enough information on long-term safety and efficacy to 
conduct exhaustive ART safety assessments would cause unnecessary delay and 
 
26 Ibid., p. 9. 
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prevent rapid feedback to patients and their doctors. It would be more productive 
to focus initially on critical safety issues from conception to six months old, 
taking a healthy single live birth as a the key indicator of a technique’s efficacy.27  
 
Nevertheless, the MRC report recognised that improving data collection and 
access to information to enable long-term research on the outcomes of assisted 
reproduction are necessary to an informed assessment of risks and it recommended that a 
number of steps be taken to enable such research to take place.28 Changes in both the 
practical processes and the legal requirements for recording information and making it 
available to researchers were put in place.29  
In respect of the balancing of risks and benefits concerning health risks to 
children who may be born as a result of the use of ART, the approach that has been taken 
in the countries discussed has generally been to permit the use of PGD in some 
circumstances, despite the difficulty of establishing the level of long-term risk, if any. As 
discussed elsewhere in this volume, evidence relating to short-term health risks so far 
does not appear to indicate particular causes for anxiety. Accordingly, while the issue of 
safety of PGD remains current, the focus of concern may be seen to have shifted: notably 
from the safety of the procedure to the reasons for using PGD and its possible effects on 
children and the wider society. Here, the evidence base for determining whether any risks 
exist is at least as, if not more, limited. Establishing the existence or not, for example, of 
a negative psychosocial impact on children born as a result of assisted reproductive 
techniques poses significant challenges in devising appropriate studies and recruiting 
sufficient numbers to enable meaningful analysis to take place. Similarly, possible effects 
upon demographics or more abstract fears such as a change in social views about 
 
27 Ibid., p. 10. 
28 Medical Research Council, ‘Assisted reproduction: a safe, sound future’, 2004. 
29 See for example 33D and 45(1) to (3A) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act and the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Disclosure of Information for Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2010. 
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disability or the possible commodification of children may be even harder to establish or 
quantify. Nevertheless, as we have seen, concerns about such risks often appear to pave 
the road to prohibitive regulation. 
Part of the problem here is that the number of people who may wish to use ART, 
while not insignificant, will be a minority of the population and those seeking to combine 
it with PGD, will be even fewer. The use of speculative fears, even those that are alleged 
to be shared by society at large, to dictate the terms on which individuals may exercise 
choice should always engender the utmost caution. This is especially true where what is 
involved is the choice to engage in what is an area of private and highly significant 
decision-making: namely, whether to seek to establish a family, and in some cases, what 
kind of family to have. That reproduction is an area of critical importance to individuals 
and couples seems so obvious as to scarcely require comment here, and it is recognised in 
international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.30 
However, the kinds of decisions that could be made as a result of the availability of PGD 
are beyond the range that was previously available to intending parents and will still be 
inapplicable to the majority who have no need of ART to procreate or who do not have 
specific reasons to seek to determine the genetic make-up of their children. Concerns that 
those who wish to have the opportunity to utilise PGD will make ‘wrong choices’ may 
suggest that those who wish to use PGD have different – unacceptable or inappropriate – 
ways of approaching decisions about founding a family from those who do not. They 
may also be based on a perception that because these are not the kinds of decisions that 
most people are faced with, or are able to make, they should not be available to anyone. 
This required acceptance of the status quo is reminiscent of arguments that mandate 
acceptance of childlessness for those who cannot procreate without medical assistance, 
and has generally been rejected.  
Of course, it can be argued that the existence of choice is not an unmitigated 
benefit to individuals and furthermore, that decision-making may be influenced by many 
factors. As has been said in respect of prenatal diagnosis ‘the very fact that a test is 
 
30 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. Article 16 
concerns the right to marry and found a family. 
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offered by doctors tends to suggest to a woman that its use is warranted and desirable’.31 
The exercise of choice may therefore be affected by third party views and pressure may 
be brought to bear to decide in particular ways. Nevertheless, it is one thing to seek to 
influence a person’s choice, it is quite another to exclude certain matters from choice 
altogether.  
Concluding reflections 
As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, it is possible that the concerns 
seemingly aroused by PGD stem in some part from a sense that science is progressing 
without the ethical scrutiny that many intuitively believe necessary, and that the kinds of 
decisions available to intending parents go beyond what virtuous parents should either 
want or make. This lurking unease is the result of apprehension based on assumptions 
that do not, it has been argued here, withstand robust scrutiny, and threatens the pursuit of 
reproductive liberty; a principle that has become increasingly important over the last 
century or so. 
The final question then must be: what is it about PGD that has resulted in such 
regulatory interest? Given that – even as its possible scope continues to expand – PGD 
remains a relatively rare procedure, it may seem that legislative interventions are 
disproportionate to any harms that may result from its use. Indeed, as is clear from this 
narrative, it is the more unusual potential applications of PGD that now ground the 
remaining objections to its use at the discretion of intending parents. That is, issues like 
sex selection for non-medical reasons are now at the forefront of the debate about PGD, 
particularly for those who oppose a liberal approach to reproductive choice, including in 
some cases access to assisted reproduction itself. The tactic is to home in on the most 
extreme example that could be imagined and then use it to show the danger of the 
enterprise being permitted at all, even if the basis for objection is entirely speculative and 
rests on assumptions of dubious validity. What this form of argument does, then, is to 
 
31 King, D.S., ‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the “new” eugenics’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 25 (1999): 176–82, at 177. 
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seek to engage people’s innate anxieties about just where science may take us. 
Additionally, it appeals to a latent sense of discomfort with the reproductive enterprise 
being structured or manipulated as opposed to ‘natural’. 
Even if this is an intelligible response, it requires justification. The liberal project 
that prefers state non-intervention in essentially private matters provides a formidable 
objection to regulatory efforts based on speculation, anxiety or moral distaste. It also, by 
clear implication, requires us to question whether or not the law is an appropriate 
mechanism in this area. As Caulfield et al. argue: 
 
Too often, we believe, the search for a regulatory response to certain scientific 
developments has led governments to adopt simple bans and prohibitions…Using 
the law in such a manner is, however, frequently an inappropriate means of 
regulating behaviour in this complex and dynamic area.32 
 
In other words, the knee-jerk response to innovation is often to use the law to 
impose moral values, even although these values may change over the years and may, in 
any case, be illegitimate. In addition, while it is clearly the case that individuals will be 
guided by their own moral values, it is less clear that concern for ‘public opinion’ or 
some aggregation of supposed moral values are in themselves sufficient justifications for 
preventing others, who do not share these values, from making choices that for them are 
morally appropriate. One major problem with the anti-liberal approach is that it imposes 
the views of one group on another. The liberal approach, on the other hand, coerces 
nobody and provides liberty for those who wish to exercise it in ways that others would 
not choose to. 
Of course, were it clear that using PGD causes actual and significant individual or 
social harm, then even the liberal account might support state intervention, but 
compelling evidence to support this does not yet appear to exist. Perhaps it may become 
available in the future, and certainly it would be appropriate to keep a watching brief. For 
 
32 Caulfield, T., Knowles, L., Meslin, E.M., ‘Law and policy in the era of reproductive 
genetics’, J Med Ethics 30 (2004): 414–17, at 414. 
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the moment, arguably, the harms most intimately connected to PGD are the restrictions 
imposed on its use.  
We do not claim that all regulation is inappropriate, however. Manifestly, there 
are genuine individual and community goals served by requiring that PGD is offered 
safely and effectively by people with relevant expertise and in accordance with the 
existing legal rules concerning consent to treatment. Maintaining these standards may 
require state intervention. However, whether or not such intervention is a necessary or 
even helpful tool in other areas must be moot. Too often responses are prohibitory rather 
than permissive; conservative rather than liberal.  
In the long run, it does not seem unreasonable to trust people to make decisions 
that are appropriate for them and their families in conjunction with their medical advisers. 
Many of the small number of people who would seek access to PGD will either be aware 
of a potential genetic problem within the family or may already have an affected child 
and there is no reason to suppose that the decisions they make will be harmful, immoral 
or unethical. 
If and when harm can be shown to result from allowing intending parents this 
freedom of choice, it may well be time for the law to intervene in a reasoned and 
appropriate manner. While the first generation of children born following PGD is still 
relatively young, to date there seems no reason to believe that the process itself causes 
harm, nor is there evidence that significant numbers of people want to use PGD, far less 
is there evidence that they would wish to do so for what can be deemed to be 
‘inappropriate’ reasons. While there may be some uses of PGD to which some will 
continue to object – for example, social sex selection – the importance of reproductive 
liberty should be the primary moral principle underpinning regulatory responses; not 
speculative fears, knee-jerk reactions, moral distaste or unreflective majoritarianism. 
 
